“We are driving towards 14,000 on GMLRs. We've been driving, as Jim has mentioned in the past, to 4,000 on Javelin, 96 on HIMARS.”

In context

“of get to those levels and sustain those levels? Or do you already have kind of funding line of sight from the Ukraine supplemental and maybe what's in the 2025 baseline budget? Maybe the 2026 baseline? I just wanted to get a sense of budget risk there in terms of what your peak rates are assuming. Jay Malave: Yes, it's really not dependent on additional supplementals. I mean a lot of this is a lot of the capacity is going to be committed and or contracted with our customer. We just, and I'll run through a couple programs. We had always been under contract to get the 550 on the PAC-3 program in 2025. We initially self-funded the investment associated with getting ourselves a 650 on PAC-3. We recently received the contract award for incremental funding on that related to the facilitation. We are driving towards 14,000 on GMLRs. We've been driving, as Jim has mentioned in the past, to 4,000 on Javelin, 96 on HIMARS. And again, the line of sight to those and the funding that's been allocated to those is quite strong, much of which is under contract already. So we view that as fairly low risk at the moment. Operator: The next question comes from Doug Harned of Bernstein. Your line is open. Douglas Harned: Good morning. Thank you. Jay Malave: Hey Doug. Douglas Harned: On F-35, there's been some noise as the new administration has come in about the F-35, but if I put all of that aside during the first Trump administration in each of the budgets F-35 volumes were cut. There seemed to be a view that we didn't need as many. Congress of course added some back. But when you look forward, you're looking at still 156 per year production rate for a while. How do you think about the interplay of budget decisions”